Aged care in Australia: part I – policy, demand and funding by unknown
  
 
 
 
 
Aged care in Australia:   
Part I – Policy, demand and funding 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEPAR research brief 2014/01 
 
  
 
Summary of brief 
 
• This is the first of two research briefs on aged care in Australia. It analyses the sector top-down, describing 
the policy landscape, as well as the demand for and funding of formal and informal aged care.  
• Policy trends: Australian aged care is undergoing major changes following a landmark review and 
announced reforms. As in other countries, the policy area is seeing trends toward more consumer-centred, 
community-based, independence-focused models of care. These also hold out a promise of greater cost-
efficiency – a concern for policy makers given an increasingly ageing population. 
• Current demand: One fifth of people aged 65+ say they need care and lifetime risk estimates suggest that 
half of men and two thirds of women aged 65 will need formal aged care in their remaining lifetime. Age 
care provision ranges from services at home (with lower complexity and unit costs), to coordinated home 
care packages and residential care (with generally higher complexity and costs). Smaller programs are 
designed to add flexibility and cater to diversity (e.g., for remote communities or those transitioning 
between modes of care).  
• Future demand: Population ageing is expected to result in increased demand for care. But there are 
uncertainties around demographic projections (Australians aged 85+ are projected to increase from two 
per cent of the population to anywhere between three and nine per cent by 2050); whether longer lives 
will be more or less healthy (international findings are mixed and Australian data deficient); the severity of 
disabling conditions (having more than one chronic disease is not uncommon); and how these will 
translate to care needs (some activities, such as bathing and eating, are good predictors of residential care 
admission and can be targeted). 
• Supply: The supply of care in Australia has historically been highly controlled, which can result in 
misallocation of resources, waiting lists, and poor quality. In response, reforms are moving toward greater 
cost transparency and gradual increases in supply.  
• Funding: Public aged care expenditure (currently around $15b, including informal care support) will be 
driven by demography, expansions in planned supply, and unit cost changes. By 2050 it is projected to rise 
from 0.8% of GDP to 1.8-2.2%, but to remain below the OECD average. Care recipients also contribute 
funding (7% of total). In practice they receive care subject to needs- and means-tests, while funding is 
channelled to home service providers through grants, and to home package and residential care providers 
based on each individual’s assessed care complexity.  
• Co-contributions: Fees are being revised but reforms may not have gone far enough in ensuring fair co-
contribution. One option is to access the vast wealth locked up in housing via equity release products 
(which are not always well designed or understood) or private aged care insurance, as has happened with 
private medical insurance and which is attracting research attention.  
• Informal care: Funding and provision of formal care presumes the existence of a large informal care 
sector. But informal care is costly to individuals, which justifies interventions such as employment 
protection (which could be better), providing various support services, and cash benefits to cover costs or 
work absences. Approaches seen in other countries can also be considered. 
•  
  
 
Summary of featured CEPAR research 
 
 
• Demand and disability: Demand for aged care is influenced by disability. CEPAR researchers 
investigated transitions between non-disability, disability, and death, based on US data. They found a 
10 per cent chance of becoming aged care disabled only at ages past 90, but the risk (and variance) 
then increases exponentially. Between age 50 and 80, there was a 10-20 per cent chance of recovery. 
CEPAR is seeking funding to obtain equivalent Australian data (box 1). 
• Demand also depends on how disability translates to admission to residential care. Again using US data, 
research shows that bathing and eating difficulties are most influential in predicting residential care 
admittance. It suggests, for example, that home modifications should target bathrooms (box 1). 
• Demand and social factors: Melbourne-based longitudinal data is used to understand the social and 
lifestyle factors for residential admission. In addition to age and disability, research finds that low social 
activity can increase the risk of admission to care, particularly for men (box 1). 
• Future demand: To understand future demand, CEPAR researchers have looked at changes in healthy life 
expectancy. Research shows that (1) in many countries, longer lives mean more years of disability; (2) some 
risk factors (stroke or cognitive impairment) have a greater effect on years with and without disability than 
others (arthritis); (3) despite their longer lives, women become frail earlier than men; but (4) men are more 
likely to have several diseases at once; and (5) as with multiple diseases there are multiple causes of death, 
so if we cured cancer, for example, other causes of death would limit increases in life by 3-4 years (box2). 
• Projecting costs: There are different approaches to projecting fiscal costs of ageing. In contrast to Treasury 
modelling, recent CEPAR modelling assumes people respond to working and saving incentives. It shows that 
between 2010 and 2050, aged care, healthcare and pension programs could increase by 84, 38, and 68 per 
cent respectively (compared to Treasury’s 2010 estimates of 125, 78, and 44 per cent) (box 3). 
• Financial product design: Increasing the funding base for aged care could include well designed financial 
products. CEPAR research shows that reverse mortgages in Australia are poorly priced – regulation and 
education may need to play a greater role to ensure better risk sharing. Researchers have also looked at how 
different products features and economic scenarios affect pricing and profits. They find lump-sum reverse 
mortgages are more profitable and less risky to providers than those with an income stream. House price 
changes by property type also matter. CEPAR researchers designed a series of house price indices and 
showed how these can be applied. For example, a reverse mortgage based on a CBD house has a higher risk 
and should be charged a higher risk premium than a contract based on a city coastline house (box 4). 
• Financial product barriers: CEPAR research reveals that providers and consumers see various benefits, risks, 
and obstacles in the reverse mortgage market. For example, there are concerns about unfamiliarity of the 
products and a lack of relevant information (including from financial advisers) (box 5). Researchers have also 
looked at perceived supply barriers for Long Term Care Insurance, which include product design issues and 
lack of clarity about who will cover which care costs in future. CEPAR is now looking at Long Term Care 
Insurance product design innovations, including care insurance alongside pension annuities (box 6). 
• Informal care: Research shows that caring responsibilities can limit carers’ social activities. Also, many older 
people live close to their children, but needing to move closer to them or to services in later life can sever 
social ties (box 7). Researchers are also looking at the impact of informal caring on work (box 8). 
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1. Introduction 
 
For a proportion of people, a long life comes with chronic illnesses, disability, or physical or 
cognitive decline. Some of them will require different levels of intervention to get on with their 
daily life. Aged care (known outside Australia as long term care, elder care, or social care) is the 
set of institutions that offers care interventions for the elderly in absence of cure.  
 
Population ageing means more people will require care and support. Much of it will be provided 
informally by family, but increasingly it will take the shape of formal aged care. Policy 
stakeholders in many countries have taken notice. Those in Australia are no exception – a 
landmark review in 2011 by the Productivity Commission has led to what will be a decade-long 
set of reforms. And many stakeholders are participating in a public and private discourse about 
the evolution of the system (see part 1 in brief 2 for summary of groups). 
 
In this setting, it is crucial to encourage an informed debate about the building blocks of an 
effective care system. This is one of two briefs offering an accessible overview of aged care 
policy in Australia, combining a broad range of data and latest insights, and capturing the 
ongoing conversation between policy and academia, particularly relating to CEPAR research.  
 
This first top-down research brief introduces the policy setting and looks at demand and funding 
of formal and informal care. The second brief takes a bottom-up approach by considering practical 
issues relating to the industry, workforce, access and quality of care. 
 
2. Bird’s-eye view 
 
As care needs differ across the population so do modes of care, often segregated into different 
programs. To orientate the reader, table 1 summarises Australian aged care programs, from 
support given at home to that offered in institutions (i.e., residential care). 
 
 Table 1  Main aged care programs in Australia, by function 
Supporting 
informal care 
Carer Allowance 
 Cash benefits to cover carers’ costs 
Carer Payment 
 Cash benefits to cover carer’s absence from work 
Preventing 
residential care 
(will be combined 
into Home 
Support Program) 
HACC (Home & Community Care) Support services at home that complement independent living 
National Respite for Carers 
Program Services that allow short term formal care arrangements 
Substituting for 
residential care 
(will be combined 
into Home Care 
Packages) 
CACP (Community Aged Care 
Packages) Coordinated home packages substitute for low-level care 
EACH (Extended Aged Care at 
Home) Coordinated home packages substitute for high-level care 
EACH-D (Extended Aged Care at 
Home - Dementia) Coordinated home packages substitute for high-level dementia care 
Residential care 
(will have new 
set of care levels) 
Residential Care with high and 
low care places Care in institutional setting, increasingly high-care 
Catering to 
diversity 
Specialised programs (e.g., 
Veteran, Transition, Respite, and 
Multi-purpose care) 
Cater to special groups or circumstances in mixed settings (e.g., 
veterans, post-hospital transition, short residential, remote) 
 
As a further starting point, it is helpful to take in a high level view of the size of the Australian 
aged care system by use (figure 1A) and cost (1B). Both figures relate to people aged 65 or over 
and consist of various data from the course of 2011-12 as well as at a given point in time within 
 
 
 
 
Population ageing 
will put pressure on 
the aged care system  
 
 
 
 
This brief looks at the 
high-level challenges 
and responses  
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 1B  Public cost of care (ages 65+, 2011-12) 
 1A  Need and utilisation of care (ages 65+, 2011-12) 
See note and sources on page 4 
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(2013b) reports that in 2008-09, residential care was the source of nine per cent of 
hospitalisations of over-65-year-olds and, from figures that include transfers between 
residential care facilities, a third of admissions into residential care were via hospital (two-
thirds of which were permanent).  
Cost of current programs 
It is instructive to compare utilisation to cost. Public expenditure on aged care was $12.5 billion 
in 2011-12 (which increased to $13.3 billion in 2012-13; DSS, 2013). Additionally, subsidised 
informal care for older people cost an estimated $1.8 billion (see note to figure 1). Residential 
care is the largest cost component despite fewer people using it than home care. This reflects 
higher intensity and complexity of care per resident and higher accommodation costs. Some 
programs, such as those for Indigenous and Culturally & Linguistically Diverse (CALD) groups, 
delivered in mixed settings, are small in utilisation and cost but represent an emerging priority. 
 
3. Policy trends 
 
Australia’s aged care system is a product of a series of ad hoc reforms (see Figure 2 and 
Kendig and Duckett, 2001). Church-based homes were the first institutions offering care 
outside the family. Besides income support, the earliest public interventions were related to 
capital funding for old persons’ hostels (which were seen as a form of welfare) and 
increasingly for nursing homes (seen as a form of healthcare). Revenue subsidies in the 1960s 
saw increases in private provision but also public expenditure. As a result, cheaper community 
care was an increasingly attractive option, which led, in the 1980s and 1990s, to the 
introduction of home based programs, consolidating previously uncoordinated services and 
introducing new, specialised ones.  
 
 2  History of aged care reforms in Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Source:  
Based on Kendig & Duckett (2001); PC (2011); dss.gov.au 
 
The following relate to figure 1 on page 3. Notes: Numbers represent stock of people at point in time (June 2011 or June 2012; including people needing 
assistance, living status, benefiting from subsidised informal care, and care places) or flow of people over year (2011-2012; including people using home 
packages, services, or hospitals). ACAT assessments is for 2010-11. Number of people rounded to closest 10k except for small numbers. Costs rounded 
to closest $100m except for small programs. May not sum to total due to rounding or because some use more than one service. Cost of carer benefits 
based on program expenditure multiplied by care receivers 65+ as % of receivers of all ages – it is an estimate, since carers may care for multiple care 
recipients and benefit level may be correlated with age of recipient. Figure 1 relates to persons 65+ but some programs may include indigenous persons 
aged 50+. Sources:  ABS (2011), DoHA (2012), FaHCSIA (unpublished), PC (2013), AIHW (2013), AIHW (2013b), AIHW (2013c). 
 
 
 
2012 Ten-year reforms 
announced; My Aged 
Care gateway  
2013 
packages 
and 
resident 
care levels 
re-defined 
 
1909-1963 
Maintenance subsidies 
for pensioners in 
Benevolent Asylums 
(substitute for Age 
Pension)  
1954 capital funding 
under Aged Persons 
Homes Act 
1963 nursing home 
benefits based on bed 
occupancy, spurring 
private provision 
1986 Needs 
assessment; Home & 
Community Care 
(HACC); Nursing homes 
and hostels become 
high and low residential 
 
1972 low care 
hostels; home 
carer benefit 
1997 major 
reforms 
introduce 
more user 
charges 
1910 
1992 Community 
Aged Care Packages 
(CACP) 
1998 Extended 
Aged Care at 
Home (EACH) 
and Dementia 
(EACH-D) 
2008 Aged 
Care Funding 
Instrument 
(ACFI) revised 
charging 
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
1956 Home Nursing 
Subsidy Act 
1970 Delivered 
Meals Subsidy  
1969 Subsidy changes 
for nursing and in-home 
provision by states 
2015 All 
Home Care 
Packages on 
Consumer 
Directed 
Care basis 
2020 
 
 
 
 
 
Some care modes 
(e.g., residential) are 
more expensive than 
others (e.g., at home) 
 
 
 
We got here by way 
of ad hoc reforms but 
a recent review has 
made way for 
fundamental changes  
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The most recent round of changes were driven by a major Productivity Commission report in 
2011 (PC, 2011). It led to the Living Longer, Liver Better reforms, which saw the introduction of 
a simplified ‘gateway’ for information and assessment, an increased but still rationed number 
of available places, revised co-contributions, enhancement of consumer choice, and proposed 
increases in funding for the workforce, as well as improvements in complaints procedures to 
tackle variability in quality. The new government’s Healthy Life, Better Ageing Agreement will 
define the ongoing reform agenda.  
 
Underpinning such reforms in Australia and elsewhere are certain intertwined long-term 
trends: a shift from a provider-led to a funder-led system, and, according to the more recent 
rhetoric, to what will be a consumer-driven or at least person-driven system, with a greater 
emphasis on choice and wellbeing but one with greater requirement for information provision 
(see brief 2 on access and quality). When given the choice most people prefer staying in their 
community and ‘ageing in place’, which underlies another major trend: a shift in emphasis 
from residential to independent living in the community. Policymakers across the OECD, 
concerned about rising costs (see figure 3) also appear to favour cheaper home-based care.  
 
In a drive to contain costs policymakers have employed strategies beyond encouraging home 
support services for older people and their carers. Alongside macro-level constraints of prices, 
supply, or budgets and micro-level changes to reimbursement contracts, regulation, and 
market mechanisms, focus is increasingly on controlling demand via preventative and re-
enabling programs (through targeted or broader, wellness and productive ageing programs; see 
box 6 in brief 2). Another demand-side strategy is to increase contributions from those who 
can pay more, up to a cap, allowing for fairer risk sharing. 
 
What do these shifts mean for the future of aged care? Arguably, Australian governments have 
not gone far enough in resolving concerns about growing public costs, unmet expectations, and 
inequitable payment arrangements. Yet, each may be addressed by moving beyond controlled, 
centralised programs towards more consumer directed care and greater contributions from those 
who can afford it (e.g., those with large housing assets). There are also structural issues. Current 
reforms follow from a 2008 transfer of policy and funding responsibility for aged care from 
states to the Commonwealth, to ensure national standardisation; but there is still poor cross-
government integration (Western Australia and Victoria are excluded) and between aged care 
and the health and disability systems (NHHRC, 2009) – an opportunity as Australia introduces a 
new national disability insurance program. 
   
 3  OECD policy makers’ priorities for aged care  
 
Note: Based on survey responses from 28 OECD countries. Source: Colombo et al. (2011)  
6% 
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24% 
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11% 
48% 
37% 
42% 
28% 
6% 
37% 
10% 
5% 
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5% 
22% 
6% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
Immigration for  caregivers
Formal care capacity & training
Individual responsibility for financing
Sharing financing burden
Coverage to people in need only
Encouraging informal care
Universal coverage of costs
Co-ordination b/w health and LTC
Quality standards of services
Encouraging home care
Fiscal and financial sustainability
 5 Most important 4 3 2 1 Least important
 
 
 
 
 
Reforms are part of a 
trend to consumer-
centred, community-
based, independence-
focused care, which 
often coincides with 
value for money 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As reforms continue 
the policy area is a 
work-in-progress  
 
For example, there 
are issues with 
supply structures and 
cross-government 
and cross-sector 
integration is lacking 
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4. Future demand 
 
Knowing that population ageing is likely to result in higher demand for care is one thing; 
assessing the level and structure of demand is another. One difficulty is that demand can 
potentially be driven by supply, so the starting point must relate to expressed need. Older 
people tend to have greater levels of activity-limiting disability (see figure 4B), so greater 
numbers and proportions of older people may translate to a greater need and demand for care 
in absolute (sheer numbers of people) and relative terms (compared to other parts of the 
economy). Yet there is significant disagreement about the magnitude of demographic change, 
the evolution of disability by age, how disability feeds into the demand for different modes of 
care, and how these inter-relationships change over time.  
 
Take population trends: demographers acknowledge that small changes in migration, fertility and 
life expectancy assumptions can lead to big differences in the projected levels of population 
ageing (McDonald, 2012). This explains why competing official projections differ according to 
the agency releasing them, the series offered by each agency, and the year of release. Figure 4A 
presents projections from the United Nations, the Australian Treasury’s Intergenerational 
Reports (IGR), and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) for over-85-years-olds. It also 
features the Productivity Commission’s projections, which include confidence intervals. The age 
group makes up just under two per cent of the Australian population currently, but their share is 
projected to increase to between three and nine per cent. 
 
It is also unclear if increases in life expectancy will be accompanied by more years in good or 
poor health – the question of whether morbidity will expand, compress, or remain stable as first 
raised by Fries (1980), remains unanswered. In Europe the evidence is mixed and most recent 
evidence from the US suggests morbidity compression (see box 2). As noted in figure 4Ci, 
between 1998 and 2009 disability-free life expectancy in Australia increased, but so did the 
expected years with a disability and with severe functional limitations. That does imply longer, 
healthier and productive lives – some older people may retain the ability to look after more 
impeded partners into their later years – but it also indicates that a longer overall life may yield 
longer spells of disability. Another way of looking at this is to interact changes in age-specific 
disability rates and population age structure to see the effect on population-wide prevalence of 
disability. Latest figures on disability rates show the total proportion of Australians with disability 
has remained steady in the recent past at 18.5% (ABS, 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, halting some diseases could presage other, more complex and expensive states of 
frailty and multi-morbidity (Jagger et al., 2011). Numbers of people with dementia are projected 
to triple between 2011 and 2050 (AIHW 2012b). A major global effort to understand the health 
challenges across countries reveals that in Australia and elsewhere, musculoskeletal problems, 
particularly lower back pain, are the top causes of “years lost to disability” among older people 
(DoH Qld, 2013), and therefore where interventions could be targeted.  
 
There is a complex link between chronic diseases, physiological impairment, performance 
limitation, and disability. A state of disability, however defined, is not synonymous with poor 
health and needing care (see disability triggers for care in box 1). The availability and take-up 
of formal aged care depends on how authorities assess need and ration provision, the 
individual’s preference for independence, early or re-enabling interventions or technologies, 
and access to informal assistance (see figure 4E(i) and (ii)).   
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(1) magnitudes of 
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 4A  There will be more older people in the population  4B  Older people are more likely to have a disability… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4C  …and longer lives can mean even more disability 
and an increasing lifetime risk of needing care 
 4D  Residential care demand may increase slower than  
population ageing given delay in entry & constant duration 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 4E  But staying at home may depend on informal care   4F  Government targets try to second guess these trends 
    
Note: IGR denotes the Intergenerational report produced by the Australian Treasury. Source: Australian Treasury (2002, 2007, 2010) , UN (2013), ABS (1996, 2008, 
2010, 2011, 2013b, 2013c), DoHA (2011), PC (2011), AIHW (2012), health.gov.au, Authors’ calculations. 
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What is the probability of moving from a state of good health to one with disability? And how 
likely is a recovery or death? CEPAR Research Fellow, Joelle Fong, CEPAR Chief Investigator, 
Michael Sherris, and PhD Candidate, Adam Shao, attempt to answer such questions, which are 
important for public care provision as well as private care insurance. 
 
In Fong et al. (2013), they looked at elderly people in the US and updated less sophisticated 
methodology used in the insurance industry since the 1990s. Results (figure 5A) suggest that 
the elderly have a 10% chance of becoming aged care disabled (2+ADLs) only at ages past 90, 
but the risk (and variance) then increases exponentially. Women have a higher risk of becoming 
disabled and differ in recovery patterns. The estimates are sensitive to disability definitions, 
which has implications for benefit triggers for care programs. CEPAR is seeking funding for a 
survey that would allow such calculations, with ACFI triggers, for Australia. Currently local 
data is insufficient to allow such estimates (though some have tried: Hariyanto et al., 2012). 
  
 
Source: Fong et al. (2013). Note: Only confidence interval for women is shown 
 
In a separate project, Fong and CEPAR Partner Investigator, Olivia S. Mitchell, answer a 
related question: How does disability translate to nursing home admission? They find, based on 
US data, that three-fifths of men aged 65 (three-quarters of women) will experience disability 
during their remaining life severe enough to trigger aged care use; and that bathing and eating 
difficulties are most influential in predicting nursing home admittance (Fong et al. 2012). To 
delay institutionalisation, policy should appropriately differentiate ADL disability types. 
Retrofitting of homes for the elderly in the community should target the bathrooms. The 
researchers aim to look at how ADL disability differs by culture by using US and Chinese data.  
 
CEPAR Chief and Associate Investigators, Hal Kendig and Collette Browning, looked at 
Melbourne-based longitudinal data to understand the social and lifestyle factors for residential 
admission. In addition to age and disability, they found that low social activity has an influence 
(see also box 6 in brief 2 on isolation). For men, disease burden was the main driver but for 
women, social vulnerability and functional capacities were more important (Kendig et al. 2010). 
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 5A  Transition probability by age, US, 1998-2010 
         Non-disabled to disabled 
 5D  Transition probability by age, US, 1998-2010 
         Disabled to dead 
 5B  Transition probability by age, US, 1998-2010 
        Disabled to non-disabled 
 5C  Transition probability by age, US, 1998-2010 
        Non-disabled to dead 
 Box 1  CEPAR research spotlight  Transition between health, disability, and care  
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A key concern for society and individuals is whether delaying death is prolonging disease and 
disability. Will morbidity compress, expand, or remain at equilibrium? According to research by 
CEPAR Partner Investigator, Carol Jagger, and other colleagues, the evidence is mixed in Europe 
(Jagger et al. 2009; see figure 4C(i) for Australia). On average, each year’s cohort of 65-year-olds 
could expect to live 1.5 to 2 months longer than the previous; but more than half of that comprised 
an increase in life with a disability, with only 65-year-old Italian women seeing a significant drop in 
life expectancy with disability over the period (Fig. 6A).  
 
        
            
Note: 6A any disability includes non-severe disability. Source: Jagger et al. (2009); Jagger et al. (2007); Romero-Ortuno et al. (2013); Alai et al. (2013) 
 
The next step will be to project healthy life expectancy. CEPAR Research Fellow, Ralph Stevens, is 
doing this by finessing actuarial methods to extrapolate to future trends of disability-free life 
expectancy and demonstrating their application with Dutch data (Majer et al., 2013).  
 
What about healthy life expectancy by disease risk factor and sex? Jagger studied these in Jagger 
et al. (2007) using UK data (figure 6B), and in Romero-Ortuno et al. (2013) across EU countries 
(figure 6C), which, by including levels of frailty (e.g., based on measures of exhaustion, slowness, 
weakness etc.) draws attention to the aphorism that ‘men die, women suffer’. 
 
What about the dynamics of multimorbidity (having two or more diseases)? Soon to be published 
findings by CEPAR Research Fellow, Vanessa Loh, and Associate Investigator, Kate O’Loughlin, 
indicate that males and older age groups have higher rates of multimorbidity. Being married or in 
a de facto relationship and having higher educational qualifications, particularly for baby boomers, 
were associated with lower rates of multimorbidity. Related to this is the study of competing 
causes of death. CEPAR Chief and Associate Investigators, Michael Sherris and Daniel Alai, with 
another colleague, quantified the impact of eliminating certain causes of death on life expectancy 
(figure 6D). Using French data, they find, for example, that a cure for cancer would extend life 
expectancy by 2.2 years for those aged 65 (and 3.4 years for newborns; Alai et al. 2013).  
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 Box 2  CEPAR research spotlight  Implications and complications of delayed death 
 
 6A  Annual change in life expectancy with any    
        disability at age 65, EU, 1996-2001 (in years) 
 6C  Life expectancy by age, sex and health  
state, EU, 2010-11 (in years) 
 6B  Life expectancy free of moderate or severe 
disability, with risk factor and w/o risk factor, at 
65 England, 1992-2002 (in years) 
 6D  Life expectancy at age 65 
        If given cause of death is   
        eliminated, France,  
        1952-2018 (in years) 
 
Studies by CEPAR 
researchers on life 
expectancy and 
healthy life expectancy 
show that… 
(1) in many countries, 
longer lives mean 
more years of 
disability… 
 
…(2) some risk factors 
(stroke or cognitive 
impairment) have a 
greater effect on years 
with and without 
disability than others 
(arthritis)… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
…(3) despite their 
longer lives, women 
become frail earlier 
than men… 
…but (4) men are 
more likely to have 
several diseases at 
once… 
 
…and (5) if we cured 
cancer, other causes 
of death would limit 
increases in life 
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A substantial proportion of people will never need any care in their lifetime. Measuring this 
lifetime risk at age 65, only two out of three women and one in two men will need any care at 
some point in their life (based on 2006-08 age-specific rates). The risk of needing residential 
care is lower – about one in two 65-year-old women and one in three 65-year-old men will 
ever access permanent residential care (figure 4C(ii)).  
 
The risk of needing residential care has increased in the past decade, consistent with the story 
that expected years in disability have gone up. Age of admission into permanent residential 
care has also increased over the same period – 83 to 84 for women and 80 to 82 for men – 
which is consistent with the finding that healthy life expectancy has increased. But despite 
more expected years with disability, the average duration in aged residential care, another 
important factor in estimating demand, has remained constant (see figure 4D(i) and (ii)). 
 
Other facets in understanding the current and future demand for care include the geographical 
distribution of need, the case mix (e.g., between low and high care and between community- 
and residential-based services), and the diversity of those seeking care (e.g., their socio-
economic status or cultural and linguistic backgrounds).  For example, there is a view that, as 
baby boomers seek to delay entry into residential care, growth in demand for high care places 
will outpace the growth for low care (Ergas and Paolucci, 2011). 
 
Attempts at projecting total demand and its structure have been made using alternative 
assumptions and methodologies (e.g., PC, 2011; Access Economics, 2011, NATSEM, 2011). 
While results vary, one constant finding is that future demand will outstrip the supply of care, 
and this on top of current under-supply. In 2012, 44 per cent of Australians with severe or 
profound disability, who lived at home, reported that their need for assistance was only partly 
met or not at all (ABS 2013), an increase of one percentage point since 1998. Frictions 
between supply and demand owe much to the centralised planning of Australia’s care industry.  
 
Policy response to demand 
 
Government controls the level and composition of supply of care places (through an accreditation 
and place allocation process), the gatekeeping that fills such places (through ACAT), and the price 
structure (through subsidies and maximum fees; see appendix tables A1 and A2). Its desire to keep 
a tight grip on the aged care system is unsurprising given the potential fiscal exposure that comes 
from being the predominant funder (see section 5). 
 
Yet, as noted by landmark reports by Hogan (2004) and PC (2011), these types of controls can 
result in various inefficiencies. For example, when rationing of resources takes the form of waiting 
lists some people who are in most need may miss out. Also, a lack of competition may result in 
some providers skimping on quality despite being allocated considerable resources. From another 
point of view, excessively restricting the supply of and access to aged care may conflict with the 
human rights approach to care (AHRC, 2012). 
 
Mitigation may involve more targeted assessments and supervision of quality (over and above 
that required to protect those who are vulnerable; see companion brief), but is at a cost of 
even more control and bureaucracy, and potentially poor consumer outcomes. This is despite 
potential options of broadening the aged care funding base (see next section).  
 
Still, some price structures have been revised to introduce transparency, and a new authority 
set up to advise on these. Also, reforms are set to increase over the next decade the planning 
ratios uses to ration care places – from 113 per 1,000 people aged 70 and over to a ratio of 125 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But more than total 
level of demand, its 
composition and 
distribution also 
matter 
 
Projections that do 
exist, show demand 
outstripping supply 
 
 
 
Supply of care in 
Australia has 
historically been 
highly controlled  
 
This can result in 
misallocation of 
resources, waiting 
lists, and poor quality 
 
 
In response, reforms 
are moving toward 
greater cost 
transparency… 
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per 1,000, but the increase will be for home care and will come at the cost of residential care 
(see figure 4F). Multiplying the ratios by the projected population (B series, ABS, 2013) 
suggests that the number of planned residential places is expected to increase from around 
190,000 in 2012 to 250,000 in 2022 and 470,000 in 2050. Planned home care places are 
expected to increase from around 55,000 to 140,000 in 2022 and 270,000 in 2050. Pegging 
targets to the number of people aged 70+ will become problematic by 2050: those aged 85+ 
are the main users of care and their number is growing faster than is the case for younger age 
groups (2050 will be the year when the last of the baby boomers will turn 85).  
 
5. Cost and funding 
 
Notwithstanding attempts to constrain the supply and price of care, an older population age 
structure is expected to increase the costs of the system substantially. Costs are also affected 
by non-demographic and/or residual factors: income and wealth elasticity (i.e. the extent to 
which households will spend any higher incomes and wealth on care services), relative prices 
of care, technology used, and balance between informal to formal care. In its estimates of the 
future cost of care, the OECD also includes the projected expenditure on health: higher health 
spending means longer survival despite ongoing health conditions (de la Maisonneuve and 
Oliveira Martins, 2013). 
 
Projections of the rise in Australian Government aged care expenditure is shown in figure 8B. 
The estimates are based on taking age-specific costs per person (assuming that disability rates 
are kept constant), inflating these based on historic unit cost growth by program (taking 
account of upward pressure from labour costs and downward pressure from productivity 
improvement), and multiplying these out by the projected population at each age. The 
estimates are also adjusted based on the assumption that in future more care will be provided 
at home and that higher wealth and income of future cohorts will reduce costs due to means 
testing. The projections see federal aged care expenditure relative to GDP more than 
doubling, from 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2010 to 1.8 in 2050 (Australian Treasury, 2010).  
 
Australian Treasury estimates are broadly in line with others, including those of the 
Productivity Commission (2011), who also project an increase of one per cent of GDP by 
2050, and more recently by the OECD (de la Maisonneuve and Oliveira Martins, 2013) who 
calculate an increase between 2010 and 2060 of 0.8 to 1.4 per cent of GDP, and Kudrna et al. 
(2013) who project an increase of 0.8 per cent (see box 3). PC (2013) estimates show a greater 
increase to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2050 and 2.6 per cent in 2060, reflecting planned increases 
in care places.  Australian Government expenditure on aged care will be at or below the 
OECD average, which is expected to reach 2.6 per cent of GDP in 2050 (figure 8C). 
 
Funding models 
 
The OECD classifies aged care funding models into three types: single universal, mixed, and 
safety-net systems, with different risk and responsibility sharing arrangements (Figure 7). 
 
Single universal systems include the tax-financed aged care schemes common to Scandinavia 
and social insurance-reliant Germany and Japan. The category also includes Belgium’s, where 
support with daily activities is provided through the health system. In most countries aged care 
and healthcare are separated in recognition of their differing functions and to reduce use of 
more expensive medical facilities. 
 
 …and gradual 
increases in supply 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total costs will be 
driven by the 
expanding supply as 
well as unit cost 
changes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government aged 
care spending is 
expected to reach  
2.2% of GDP by 2050, 
but still below OECD 
average 
 
 
There are different 
approaches to funding 
aged care. In some 
countries care is 
funded universally, 
with no means test 
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Mixed systems have three sub-types: parallel universal, means-tested, or a fragmented mix of 
these. For example, Scotland has a series of parallel universal programs offered in home and 
residential settings – accommodation costs are paid by users but free nursing care is provided 
through the health system and free personal care by local authorities, regardless of means.  
 
In mean-tested schemes benefits are withdrawn based on an individual’s level of income or 
wealth. This is the model adopted in Australia, Ireland, Austria, and France. In Australia the 
benefits traditionally relate to in-kind services, where a provider delivers care to a needs- and 
means-assessed individual and is paid by the government. This is differentiated from the 
French system, where individuals receive needs- and means-tested cash benefits directly. 
 
In another group of countries with mixed systems the financing is more varied: some services 
are universal, some are means-tested and some are absent altogether. For example, in 
Switzerland, universal nursing care is funded through mandatory social insurance but personal 
care benefits are modest and means-tested. In Greece there is no formal home care and only 
institutional care is offered, regardless of means but subject to available places.  
 
Finally, some countries fund aged care only as a safety net – if an individual’s income or assets are 
below a set threshold. In the US care is provided for the very poor via Medicaid, a social health 
insurance. England offers non-means-tested cash benefits on account of disability, but aged care 
subsidies are only available if an individual’s assets are low; the state then meets some of the aged 
care cost depending on the individual’s assessable income. As will be the case in Australia, England 
is introducing a lifetime cap on the amount of care costs that an individual will need to pay. This 
introduces an insurance element into the system. 
 
System design determines how formal aged care costs are shared between social insurance, tax 
and private contributions (figure 8D). In Australia, tax-payer funding makes up 93 per cent of 
aged care expenditure – less than in countries with single tax-funded universal models (e.g., 
Sweden), and more than in social insurance funded countries (e.g., Germany) or those that 
have higher levels of private contributions (e.g., Switzerland). These structures also affect the 
proportion of the population covered by formal care arrangements and their split between 
home and institutional care (Figure 8E).  
 
 7  Australia has a mixed income-related aged care system, with mixed pooling/responsibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Colombo et al. 2011 and Wanless 2006.  
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 8A  Like some other government programs, aged care 
expenditure is strongly linked to age 
 8B  As the population ages, Commonwealth aged care 
spend is projected to keep increasing faster than GDP 
  
 8C  Projected fiscal impact in Australia is not as high as in 
some countries, but is still significant 
 8D  Less than a tenth of aged care funding in Australia 
(2011) is through private co-contributions  
  
 8E  Policies and funding affect how much and what type  
       of care is used by the older population  
 8F  Funding in medium term is based on a 5-year $3.7b 
package of redirected budgets + means testing savings 
  
Note: Figure 8C slightly underestimates Australia’s public expenditure relative to other countries, since it only includes federal government spending. In figure 8D data for 
Australia and Japan is for 2010 and for Israel is 2009. Source: PC (2013), Australian Treasury (2010), DoHA (2010), Colombo et al. (2013), OECD (2013), DoHA (2012b) 
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Estimating long term costs of spending programs often involves a form of micro-simulation (e.g., 
as used by Australian Treasury), where the numbers of different types of households are 
projected into the future and interacted with the expected evolution of costs for that type of 
household. These are then compared with the supply side of the economy that combines 
population, participation, and productivity to estimate GDP, the denominator. Commonly, this 
type of analysis assumes limited or no behavioural responses of households and omits feedback 
effects – e.g., if population ageing increases spending and taxes, it might also discourage 
younger households from working and further impact on the budget.  
 
CEPAR Chief Investigator, Alan Woodland, and Research Fellow, George Kudrna, and 
Associate Investigator, Chung Tran, have instead built a general equilibrium model of the 
Australian economy in which households make lifetime decisions based on economic 
incentives. These are in turn dynamically affected by policy and demographic changes. 
Admittedly, not all households act so rationally, but the model only requires that on average the 
different groups do so. It is also anchored in such a way that it is able to explain current 
outcomes before turning to the future.  
 
In Kudrna et al. (2013), they show how demographic shifts can affect output, expenditure and 
taxes. They project that between 2010 and 2050, aged care, healthcare and pension programs 
costs could increase by 84, 38, and 68 per cent respectively (compared to Treasury’s 2010 
estimates of 125, 78, and 44 per cent), with aged care expected to see the greatest level of 
expenditure growth. The extra costs could by 2050 require an estimated 40 per cent cut to non-
age-related spending or a 34 per cent increase in consumption taxes (figure 9). Mechanical 
though such analyses are (see Kendig, 2010, for a critique), they provide a helpful measure of 
what might happen if certain assumptions were to hold. 
 
     
     
Source: Kudrna et al., 2013 
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 Box 3  CEPAR research spotlight  Fiscal impacts of population ageing: Alternative models 
 
  9B  Projected expenditure relative to GDP, by 
program, Australia, 2010-2050 (% of GDP) 
 9C  Projected expenditure relative to GDP, by 
program, Australia, 2010-2050 (% of GDP) 
 9D  Projected tax revenue (% of GDP) 
 9A  Projected growth of relative expenditure, 
by program, Australia, 2010-2050 (%, annual) 
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understand potential 
spending and revenue 
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Public funding in practice 
 
In Australia, public funding is delivered through subsidies paid directly to providers. These are 
set according to care need: the more complex the need the more subsidies and supplements.  
 
For HACC programs, funding contracts require a certain number of services delivered in a 
given area. For home care packages, ACAT assessment determines levels of subsidy. And for 
residential care, once need is established by an ACAT assessment and the individual enters 
care, the care home conducts its own appraisal used to apply for public funding. This is based 
on a schedule known as the Aged Care Funding Instrument (ACFI).  
 
Multiple assessments can be problematic and could benefit from streamlining (Sansoni et al, 
2012). In theory assessments are portable between locations but not easily between programs 
that should be equivalent (a separate issue can occur when moving older people closer to their 
children: guardianship and trusteeship for parents with dementia do not apply interstate). 
 
ACFI attributes a different level of subsidy or funding supplement to each combination of nil, 
low, medium, and high need across ADL, behaviour, and health categories (appendix table 
A1). To reduce bureaucratic burden the measure relates to usual rather than actual need, and 
assessment requires various diagnostic tools (e.g., Cornell Scale for Depression) and records 
(e.g., continence record). Neither ACAT nor ACFI assessments take direct account of 
trajectories of morbidity (box 1), but care recipients may be re-classified as their needs change. 
 
The subsidies are additive – a care recipient scoring highly across all three types of subsidy 
would attract funding of $184 per day or $67,000 per annum in 2013-14. Additional funding is 
available for certain conditions (e.g., enteral feeding, oxygen support, or for respite costs), for 
participating in surveys, and to help with the extra costs of remoteness. Confusingly, there is a 
dementia supplement in addition to what is available through ACFI for those with particularly 
challenging behaviours. Government monitors claims via random checks and reassessments 
that can result in either funding upgrades, or, more likely, downgrades. Subsidy claims are only 
approved for places that had previously been allocated (see discussion about supply, above; 
funding may be lower if facilities have too few residents whose accommodation is subsidised).  
 
It is unclear how well subsidies match actual costs, whether the varied and complicated weighting 
procedure is necessary for these to match, and whether more funding or a re-classification for 
given conditions leads to a difference in actual attention and care that an individual receives – all 
questions the new Aged Care Funding Authority may potentially investigate. 
 
Private funding in practice 
 
Care recipients who can afford to, contribute to the cost of their care and accommodation. 
Fees are summarised in table 2, and in more detail in appendix table A2 (pre-reform) and A3 
(post-reform). These can take the form of flat, means-tested, per-item charges, as well as 
interest-free loans to the care provider. 
 
Reforms are altering the pricing structure (e.g., care and accommodation fees are separated 
and individuals can choose between lump-sum or periodic accommodation payments), the 
price levels (e.g., higher accommodation price levels), subsidies (e.g., higher maximum 
accommodation payment), the means test for residential and home care, and introduce yearly 
and lifetime caps on care fees. For residential care, the means test results in fully supported 
residents (who pay the basic fee out of their Age Pension or who are otherwise publicly 
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increases with need, 
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and could be 
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one assessment has a 
gatekeeping function, 
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means  
But the system is 
being reformed 
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covered by ‘hardship’ arrangements), partly supported residents (who pay the basic fee, some 
accommodation fees, but no care fee), and non-supported residents (who pay the basic fee, 
full accommodation fees, and some or all of the care fee up to the cap).  
 
Unbundling of care and accommodation fees makes sense. Uncertainty about needing high 
care means the risk should be socialised (achieved by the means-test and cap). Housing costs 
are more predictable and paying for them should be mostly the responsibility of the individual.  
 
Private contributions make up about 7 per cent of formal aged care spending (see also figures 
4E and 4F in the companion brief on contribution of fees to provider revenue). Since the 
greater the care recipient’s ability to pay, the more subsidies are clawed back from providers, 
more aggressive means-testing will translate to public savings. The reforms, which also 
included considerable redirecting of funds and a deferral of large spending increases, were part 
funded by savings resulting from the means-testing arrangements (see figure 8F).  
 
Nonetheless, the co-contribution structure still protects wealthy homeowners from the means 
test, creating inequity and distorting asset prices. Neglecting the vast housing equity locked up 
in real estate is a missed opportunity to enhance inter- and intra-generational fairness of 
funding, address gaps in aged care quality and quantity, and improve the viability of providers. 
Unlike trends within the pension and health systems in Australia, where a greater responsibility 
has been transferred to private individuals, aged care remains firmly a publicly funded domain. 
 
 Table 2  Post-reform fee structure summary 
Fee Residential care (no high-low 
distinction as before) Residential respite Home care packages 
Basic daily fee  
Up to a maximum, set just below 
full Age Pension 
Up to a maximum, set just 
below full Age Pension 
Up to a maximum, set well below 
full Age Pension 
Care fee  
Based on new means test (asset 
& income) with a disregarded 
amount then tapers up to caps 
n/a 
New income test with a 
disregarded amount then taper 
up to caps 
Accommodation fee 
Based on means test and choice 
of facility, payable by new Daily 
Accommodation Payment (DAP), 
or Refundable Accommodation 
Deposit (RAD) 
n/a n/a 
Extra service charge 
Paid if entering place with above 
standard quality (regulated 
maximum) 
Paid if entering place with 
above standard quality 
(regulated maximum) 
n/a 
Additional amenity fee  
Pre-agreed between provider and 
resident. Per amenity (e.g., 
newspaper / hairdressing) 
Pre-agreed between provider 
and resident. Per amenity (e.g., 
newspaper / hairdressing) 
n/a 
 
Broadening the funding base – equity release 
 
Two ways to broaden the aged care funding base involve equity release products and private 
insurance. Both were previously raised by the Productivity Commission (2011, 2013)  
 
Equity release products, such as reverse mortgages, allow individuals to make use of home equity 
without having to move, not just to pay for aged care but more generally as a form of greater 
late-life financial security. A reverse mortgage, for example, involves cash advances that are 
repaid only after the property is sold, usually after death. These are an alternative to the 
traditional approach of selling-up or downsizing and can be particularly useful for older 
Australians, who are often income poor but asset rich (figure 10A). Ownership patterns among 
older people are projected not to change dramatically: in 2030 older Australians are expected to 
own 47 per cent of household wealth while making up 19 per cent of the population (PC, 2011). 
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in ensuring a fair co-
contribution regime 
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The current level of demand for equity release products is growing. In 2012, there were over 
40,000 reverse mortgage loans taken out in Australia worth $3.6 billion, a four-fold increase in 
value since 2005 (figure 10B). There are also some restricted versions of reverse mortgages 
operated by Australian governments (e.g., Pension Loan Scheme via Centrelink, and Australian 
Capital Territory and South Australian rate deferral schemes; PC, 2013).  
 
There are other innovative products. For example, home reversion schemes transfer 
ownership to the provider but involve a lifetime lease (see box 4). These can set a limit on the 
share of equity that can be sold to a home reversion company, leaving the rest to customers 
who might one day wish to fund aged care after the property is fully sold. 
 
A third of Australian baby boomers expected to use all their assets before they die (Olsberg 
and Winters, 2005). Some may sell and downsize – for example, older homeowners report 
wanting to age in place (65%). Still, a majority (83%) are attached to the area rather than the 
family home (Olsberg and Winters, 2005). Older users of equity release products often do so 
to maintain, rather than increase, spending; many access home equity to maintain 
independence when faced with health issues and low economic resources (Ong et al. 2013). 
 
But there are various obstacles in the way (see box 5) and examining the risks quantitatively 
reveals that current products are not always well designed and priced (see box 4). More 
competitive and smarter pricing by providers, regulation that better protects consumers (e.g., 
caps on loans), less restrictive government provision (e.g., through Centrelink), financial 
education of consumers and advisers, and reviewed pension and aged care means tests could 
transform how households contribute to aged care and fund their retirement.  
 
To really access home equity as a complimentary funding base, homes could be included in the 
pension and aged care asset tests alongside reverse mortgage instruments that would claw back 
pension and/or aged care benefits when the home is sold (also raised by the Grattan Institute 
in Daley et al. 2013). It would allow asset rich pensioners to receive a pension and care, stay at 
home, and pay their way. 
 
10A  Older Australians: income poor & asset rich  10B  Reverse mortgages are converting an 
increasing number/value of assets into cash 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PC (2013), Deloitte Actuaries & Consultants (2013)  
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The market for equity 
release products has 
grown dramatically... 
 
 
 
 
…unsurprising given 
they are consistent 
with people’s 
aspirations and needs 
 
But design and 
understanding of 
equity release 
products is lacking… 
 
…and unleashing their 
potential to fund aged 
care would require 
means test changes 
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Designing RM products requires an understanding of what will happen to the values of the 
loan and the home equity that eventually repays that loan. These are subject to different risks. 
 
For providers, if the house value grows too slowly or declines then the sale can earn less than 
the loan has cost. Providers normally can’t ask for more money – RMs act as a guarantee that a 
customer will not fall into debt as a result of the contract. But how can providers distinguish 
between houses when drawing up contracts? CEPAR PhD Candidate, Adam Shao, Chief 
Investigator, Michael Sherris, and Associate Investigator, Katja Hanewald, try to answer this 
question. In Shao et al. (2013) they construct house price indices based on a large data set of 
Sydney property transactions between 1971 and 2011, which include characteristics such as 
house location, age, and size. This allows them to estimate the likely evolution of prices by type 
of house (figure 11A and B).  
 
In Shao et al. (2012), they evaluate providers’ house price risks in practice. For example, all else 
being equal, a reverse mortgage based on a CBD house has a higher risk and should be charged 
a higher risk premium than a contract based on a city coastline house. In Shao et al. (2014) they 
take this even further by combining house price risk with longevity risk (i.e., consumers living 
longer than expected) and analyse the impact of non-mortality related causes of reverse 
mortgage termination, including entry into long-term care, prepayment and refinancing. 
 
   
Note: CI denotes Confidence Interval. Source: Shao et al. (2012) 
 
That covers the value of the home. The other side of the equation is the loan value, which 
varies with interest rates over time, and of course the time itself – how long the customer lives. 
With CEPAR Graduate Student, Daniel Cho (Cho et al., 2013), the CEPAR team estimate how 
different economic scenarios affect pricing and profits. They find lump-sum RMs are more 
profitable and less risky to providers than those made up of an income stream. It explains why 
the former dominates most markets. 
 
Michael Sherris and CEPAR Associate Investigator, Daniel Alai, in Alai et al (2013b) also look 
at provider risks, but include home reversion contracts (where ownership passes to the 
provider at a discount in exchange for a lifelong lease). The authors find both products to be 
poorly priced in Australia, in favour of providers, and urge for regulation and education to 
ensure better risk sharing. 
 
Finally, Hanewald and Sherris, in Hanewald et al. (2013) consider fairly priced reverse 
mortgages and home reversions from the householder’s perspective, taking account of 
longevity, house price, interest rate, and aged care risks. It turns out that a retiree gains utility 
from either product, but more from reverse mortgages. There is also an advantage to unlocking 
home equity early in retirement – the longer they live the more they gain from the contract.  
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 Box 4  CEPAR research spotlight  Designing reverse-mortgage (RM) products 
 11A  Sydney CBD House Price Index, 1992-2021  11B  Sydney House Price Index, 1992-2021 
 
Lower bound 95% CI 
Forecast HPI 
 
Good RM product 
design starts with 
understanding risks 
 
For example, there is 
the possibility that 
selling the house will 
not be enough to 
cover provider’s costs 
 
This is why CEPAR 
research, which shows 
house price changes 
by property type is so 
useful 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEPAR research is also 
shedding a light on 
longevity and interest 
rate risks 
 
…and that Australian 
consumers are paying 
a premium while 
retaining much of the 
risk of current equity 
release products 
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Markets for equity release products are still underdeveloped so research on their design (see 
box 4) as well as studies on public and provider perceptions are still new and evolving.  
 
Chief Investigator, Hal Kendig, was part of an Australian Housing and Urban Research 
Institute (AHURI) project that involved interviewing providers and consumers to distil the 
benefits, risks, and obstacles in the RM market (see table 3; Bridge et al., 2010; see also Ong et 
al., 2013, for more detailed analysis). For example, the research highlighted concerns about the 
unfamiliarity of the products and a lack of relevant information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Broadening the funding base – Long term care insurance 
 
Long term care insurance (LTCI) is sometimes disregarded as a viable funding option because 
of demand and supply side reasons. These often relate to lack of information, incentives, 
insurability, or ‘rational’ behaviour (Brown and Finklestein, 2007, 2008 and 2009; Zhou-
Richter and Grundl, 2010). 
 
Even in different institutional settings observed in other countries, the market for long term 
care insurance is underdeveloped. Indeed, no country’s LTCI market operates as well as the 
markets for other types of insurance. So what hopes are there for such a market? 
 
The US has the largest LTCI market in absolute and relative terms, with private insurance covering 
seven per cent of aged care expenditure (Centres for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2008). In the 
US insurance companies reimburse customers for a set of approved care expenses. In France, 
where the insurance model provides small amounts of top-up cash benefits, the total contribution 
of LTCI is lower, but there is much broader coverage with a take-up of 15 per cent of the 
population. In various countries LTCI and reforms that would encourage it remain a live topic 
(Lloyd, 2011). 
 
There is a question of whether, between Australia’s aged care safety net and the cap for care 
fees, there is enough incentive to self-insure, and what form this insurance could take (box 6). 
Should appropriate frameworks and incentives be put in place, the policy direction of 
enhanced choice could lead us some way toward private aged care insurance, much as has 
happened with private medical insurance in recent decades.  
 Box 5  CEPAR research spotlight  Reverse-mortgage (RM) market issues 
 Consumers Providers 
RM benefits • Release equity but remain at home 
• Top-up income stream or one off spending 
• Fund home maintenance / age-adaptation  
• Gifting now instead of as inheritance 
• Guarantee of no negative equity 
 
• Fills gap in market 
• Greater products range for clients 
• Growth area as population ages 
 
Risks • Compound interest means low value if taken at early age 
• Fixed RM interest > market interest could mean low value 
• Lack of legal and financial expertise of advisers 
• Break fees for premature finalisation (pre-pay penalty) 
• Potential tax or pension means test impacts 
 
• Falling house prices, since these 
comprised the repayment 
• Negative tax changes (e.g., when 
profits are realised) 
Obstacles • Lack of legal and financial expertise of advisers 
• Exclusion of some (e.g. by age or property type) 
• Some products require fees in addition to interest 
• Lack of use of RM calculators by brokers / lenders 
• Lack of range of information on products 
• Product complexity and related 
cost of face-to-face interactions 
• High level of documentation 
• Current commission levels 
• Exclusion clauses 
• Low community awareness 
Adapted from Bridge et al. (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another option to 
broaden funding is to 
look at private aged 
care insurance, as has 
happened with 
private medical 
insurance 
 
 
 
 Table 3  Benefits, risks and obstacles of Reverse Mortgages 
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One reason for an underdeveloped Long Term Care Insurance (LTCI) market in Australia may 
be reluctance on behalf of financial services providers. To understand this issue in more detail, 
CEPAR PhD Student, Bridget Browne (2012), surveyed leaders in the financial services and 
insurance industry.  She found that on balance they believed the residual risk associated with 
aged care costs in Australia was insurable. However they pointed to significant hurdles (see 
figures 12A and B) that would need to be overcome, including product design, effective 
marketing, and clarity from government about what care costs it will cover in future.  
 
 
                                                                
 Note: Wording of response options shown in figure have been edited down from the original. Source: Browne 2012 
 
It is worth understanding LTCI alongside pension annuities. Both have benefits as insurance 
contracts. The former can insure against high costs of aged care; the latter insures the 
purchaser against inflation, poor returns, and outliving their savings. Besides the often-quoted 
barriers to take-up, the interactions between the two instruments may be relevant: Why 
annuitise if you want savings to cover potential out-of-pocket health and caring costs? 
 
CEPAR PhD student, Shang Wu, along with CEPAR Senior Research Fellow, Ralph Stevens, 
and CEPAR Associate Investigator, Hazel Bateman, are looking at developing a so-called LTC 
annuity which provides additional benefits for aged care costs.  
 
The project will provide empirical evidence, theoretical justification, and pricing aids for the 
new product while taking into account the announced reforms and existing institutional 
features of the LTC system in Australia, the UK and US.  
 
The team intend to calculate optimal decisions and also to run annuity experiments to study 
how the lifetime cap on an individual’s aged care expense (being introduced in Australia and 
UK) will affect an individual’s insurance decisions. From the insurance provider’s point of 
view, the researchers will look at implications for diversification and adverse selection.  
 
Such research will be particularly meaningful to annuity providers looking at a new generation 
of innovative annuity products, which some scholars (Americs et al., 2011) see as a new growth 
market over the next decade. 
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 Box 6  CEPAR research spotlight  Long term care insurance 
 12A  Provider ratings of demand-side barriers (n=26) 
          from ‘4 - extremely significant’ to ‘1 - no barrier’ 
 12B  Provider ratings of supply-side barriers (n=26) 
          from ‘4 - extremely significant’ to ‘1 - no barrier’ 
 
Profitability / market size 
 
Regulatory constraints or 
uncertainty 
 
Lack of knowledgeable 
financial advisors 
 
Other barrier 
 
Uncertainty re costs 
 
Uncertainty re demand 
 
Uncertainty re 
institutional design 
 
Risk of adverse selection 
 
Reputational risk 
 
Costs and uncertainty of 
assessing individuals 
Complexity and cost of  
insurance products 
 
Ignorance of risks, lack of  
financial advice / capability 
 
Belief in full cover by state 
 
Behavioural barriers 
 
Belief in family care  
 
Unpredictability of needs/ 
insurance coverage 
 
Leaving/expecting bequest  
 
Distrust of financial services 
 
Other barriers 
 
CEPAR research shows 
that supply barriers 
include product design 
and lack of clarity 
about who will cover 
which care costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And future work will 
look at how best to 
design products 
alongside pension 
annuities 
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6. Informal Care  
 
Informal care determines the level, composition, and cost of formal care. It is provided by 
family, friends and neighbours and is assumed to make up the majority of all care for older people. 
In 2012, 2.7 million people (1.9 million according to the 2011 Census) identified as informal carers 
to older or disabled people, with 400,000 as primary carers to those aged 65 and over (ABS, 2013).  
 
The future supply of informal carers will depend not only on the relative size of age groups 
who have traditionally been carers but also on cohabitation and family formation patterns (see 
box 7), labour force participation, particularly of women, and general willingness to take on 
the role (Nepal et al., 2011). An attempt in 2003 to project primary carer numbers in 2013 was 
some 200,000 people (or 34%) lower than the outcome (though it’s unclear whether the 
difference was demand or supply driven; Jenkins et al., 2003; also NATSEM, 2004).  
 
Informal carers are often older and mostly women; the majority care fewer than ten hours per 
week; and the recipients of their care tend to be partners or parents (ABS 2013; see box 7 and 
appendix figure A1, panels A to D for an OECD comparison). Of the reasons that Australian 
primary carers reported for taking on the role, the most common was out of family responsibility 
(63%) or because they thought they would provide better care than others (50%; ABS 2013). 
 
The value of unpaid care was estimated to be worth $40 billion in Australia in 2010 (Access 
Economics, 2010). Yet it comes at a cost. Carers work less and are more likely to be in poverty 
(due to lower income, not necessarily lower wages) and are more likely to suffer mental health 
problems (appendix figure A1, panels E and F). But negative effects are driven by high-intensity 
care (more than 20 hours) and cohabitation suggesting that interventions should target these carers. 
Colombo et al. (2011) suggest that the large number of carers with few hours of care in OECD 
countries means that there is scope to increase the total volume of informal care with limited 
negative impacts (see box 8 for similar insights for Australia).  
 
Research by Australia’s National Seniors Productive Ageing Centre (Adair et al. 2013) finds that 
carer support and flexible working patterns are crucial to improve employment options for 
informal carers. For example, based on a large representative survey, they find that among non- 
employed carers whose caring prevented them from working, 46 per cent said they would work if 
suitable external care were accessible, while 61 per cent said they would work an average 18-hour-
week if flexible work arrangements were available. Similarly, half of such carers who already 
worked part time said they would work more if such flexible arrangements were offered. 
 
Supporting informal carers  
 
The need to support informal care is not lost on policy makers. The response in Australia has seen 
a new policy framework – National Carer Strategy, which sets priorities for action on areas that 
include information provision, economic security, education, and health. A new legal framework 
was also introduced – the Carer Recognition Act 2010, which places obligations, unenforceable 
though they are, on public bodies to abide by a set of principles and respect the rights of carers. 
 
But, additional legal protections can be built-in to help with employment arrangements. Australia’s 
Fair Work Act 2009 has recently been amended to allow carers to request flexible arrangements, 
refusable on reasonable business grounds. The Act also entitles carers to ten days of paid leave, but 
only when the care is for immediate family or household, rather than the full range of care 
 
Funding and provision 
of formal care 
presumes the 
existence of a large 
informal care sector 
 
 
 
Informal carers are 
often older women, 
who provide care for a 
few hours a week out  
 
Those who care for 
many hours per week, 
such as cohabiting 
carers, can experience 
negative health and 
employment impacts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Responses have 
included (1) 
recognising carers … 
 
…(2) ensuring 
employment 
protections… 
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relationships (see box 7), and casual workers remain unprotected (AHRC, 2013). Here, employers 
could play their part and reap the benefits of a more flexible work culture. 
 
There is also a range of direct services to support carers. These can be complimentary to the 
informal care (e.g., HACC program, Veteran’s Home Care services), a temporary substitute (e.g., 
respite at home, in a day centre, or in a residential facility for up to 63 days a year), take the form of 
social and emotional help (e.g., the National Carer Counselling Program funded by government but 
delivered by carer associations), provide education (e.g., Dementia Education and Training for Carers), or 
offer information and coordination in recognition that services still require a certain level of 
management on behalf of carers (e.g., Commonwealth Respite and Carelink Centres). The National Respite 
for Carers Program separately funds many of these but some will be merged under one program 
known as the Home Support Program, from 2015, addressing the sometimes fractured nature of 
support. 
 
Finally, the Australian Government offers financial support to carers. This consists of a Carer 
Allowance (a supplement to cover some costs of caring, worth around 15 per cent of the Age 
Pension) and Carer Payment (for cohabiting carers unable to work as a result of caring, 
consistent with the value of the Age Pension; see section 2 on aggregate costs and take-up).  
 
The Carer Payment is means- and work-tested which may result in disincentives to work. For 
example, claims are reviewed if the carer works, studies, or volunteers more than 25 hours a 
week, but some report that the 25-hour-rule triggers immediate cessation of eligibility (Carers 
Australia, 2013). One unintended consequence of cash payments is that these may monetise 
family relations.  
 
Carer support in Australia shares similarities with what is seen elsewhere, but there is a variety 
of approaches (Table 4) and limited research on what works. Notable examples of support 
that exist elsewhere but not in Australia include tax incentives for care and contributions to 
pensions. The latter is implicitly included in Australia’s non-contributory, means-tested Age 
Pension, which compensates those who did not accumulate adequate Superannuation, a type 
of contributory ‘pension’. However this compensation is not exclusively targeted at carers. 
 
 
 Table 4   Informal care support in Australia and OECD, 2009-10 
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 Carer allowance Y N ** ** N Y Y N N Y Y N N N N N Y Y Y N Y N N Y N Y N 
 Care recipient 
allowance N Y Y N Y N N Y Y N N Y N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y N Y ** 
 Tax credit N N N Y N N N Y Y N Y N N N Y N N Y N N N N N N Y N Y 
 Pension accrual N Y N Y Y N N Y Y Y Y  N N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y Y N Y N 
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 Flexible work N Y Y ** Y ** Y Y Y Y N 
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 Education Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y 
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 Respite care Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Y Y N Y 
 
N N N N Y Y N N 
 
Y Y Y Y Y ** 
 Counselling Y Y Y Y Y 
  
Y 
 
Y 
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Y Y Y Y Y ** 
 
 Note: * only 2 days for emergency; ** Not nationwide but industrial or sub-national arrangement; Based on country survey for arrangements 
in 2009-10. Source: Adapted from Colombo (2011) 
 
 
…(3) providing a 
number of in-kind 
support services… 
 
 
 
 
…and (4) cash benefits 
to cover costs or 
absence from work 
 
But there are issues 
with existing 
arrangements and 
potential to explore 
those seen in other 
countries 
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In many cases the main informal carer is an older family member, such as a spouse or mature-
age child. So it is important to conduct research on informal care from the perspective of the 
older carer. CEPAR Associate Investigator, Heather Booth, with colleagues at ANU and 
National Seniors Australia, has done precisely that. 
 
The team sampled 2,000 Australians aged 50+ in 2010/11, and showed that 13% of females 
and 9% of males identified as a carer, with many providing care for several years. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, carers in their fifties were most likely to care for their parents while those aged 
70+ were mostly providing care for their partner. Women and older carers are quite likely to 
care for a neighbour or friend, which is much rarer for male carers (figure 13). The time spent 
providing care seems to vary but it has its impact – a third said that providing care limits their 
social activities often or always (Booth and Rioseco, 2013). 
 
    
 
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100% because of multiple responses. Source: Social Networks and Ageing Project (SNAP, 2013)  
     
Such informal care depends on residential proximity. Respondents tended to live near their 
children – three quarters live within an hour's travel time – but sometimes seeking care means 
needing to move home. A third of those aged 70+, who moved recently, did so to be nearer to 
their family or to services. Such moves often involved distances of more than one hour's travel 
time, severing social activity with neighbours and local friends (Booth and Rioseco, 2012). 
 
CEPAR Research Fellow, Shiko Maruyama, has also looked at the question of proximity but 
through the prism of economic incentives. Children ‘gain’ if their siblings look after elderly 
parents, but providing care themselves can be ‘costly’. This creates a ‘free-rider’ problem where 
children move away to shirk the responsibility. Using US data in a game theoretic framework, 
he finds such attempts at free-riding are non-negligible and that 18% of parents in families with 
multiple children miss out on having at least one child nearby (Maruyama and Johar, 2013). 
 
What about cohabitation with elderly parents? In Johar and Maruyama (2011), he investigated 
the drivers of cohabitation in Indonesia, finding that the decision is largely influenced by the 
incentives of adult children: cohabitation is more likely among healthy parents with greater 
wealth. In other papers (Maruyama, 2012; Johar and Maruyama, forthcoming) he finds a 
negative impact of cohabitation on parental health and survival, taking account of causality. 
Interestingly, this is not the case for parents who are socially active. Cohabitation could worsen 
parental health because parents may invest less in their own wellbeing.  
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 Box 7  CEPAR research spotlight  Older informal carers, proximity, and cohabitation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research shows that 
caring can limit carers’ 
social activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Many older people 
live close to their 
children, but moving 
closer to them or to 
services in later life 
can sever social ties 
 
Other CEPAR research 
shows that the costs 
of caring can have an 
impact on whether 
children move away 
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Two priority areas in Australia’s National Carer Strategy are the economic security and health 
of carers. But there is much that we still don’t understand about the trade-offs between work 
and care, and how these affect wellbeing. For example, while caring can affect carers negatively, 
limited hours of care have been shown to have a positive effect on life satisfaction. This is what 
a team led by CEPAR Chief Investigator, Hal Kendig, has found, using Australian data. 
 
His team, including CEPAR Associate Investigator, Kate O’Loughlin, and Research Fellow, 
Vanessa Loh, are working on a project to better understand how societal and policy context 
influences working and care-giving, work-care transitions, and impacts on individuals and 
economic activity. In a forthcoming paper, they find the now familiar pattern: greater hours of 
care are associated with less paid work, particularly in the case of more than 15 hours of care 
and poorer health. But while economic outcomes are largely explained by gender (figure 14 for 
60-64-year-olds) – women are more likely to be carers and work less – health outcomes appear 
to be associated with the caring role. The team will look at cross-national differences and the 
effect of policy (e.g., whether retirement schemes impact on caregivers’ work choices). 
 
     
Source: O’loughlin et al. (Forthcoming) 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This first of two research briefs on aged care in Australia looked at the system top-down. It 
captures the aged care system as it transitions, not only in response to the current reform agenda 
but also in adapting to wider market, social, and demographic changes. The types of research 
insights highlighted in these briefs can guide decision makers in aged care as the system evolves. 
 
Funding aged care will remain a key preoccupation of policy makers. Demographic trends are 
expected to put upward pressure on aged care budgets. But some of the other trends in aged 
care are a win-win for both care recipients and those concerned with care costs: (1) a shift to 
consumer-centred care both enables choice and can give way to market discipline, improving 
efficiency (see brief 2 on Consumer Directed Care); (2) more community-based care allows people 
to age-in-place and can put downward pressure on the demand for more expensive residential care; 
and (3) more independence-focused models of care allow people to get on with their lives by 
emphasising prevention and enablement, which also takes pressure off the care system. There is 
another win-win worth exploring: greater contributions from those with substantial housing 
assets could be a way of dealing with the public’s unmet expectations for care, addressing 
perceptions of inequitable contributions, and tackling growing public costs.   
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 14  Caregiving by hours of care, gender and work status 
        of 60-64-year-olds (% caregiving) (n=1261) 
 
An evolving area of 
CEPAR research is 
around informal care 
and work 
 
 
Initial results suggest 
economic outcomes 
for carers are 
explained by gender 
and health outcomes 
by the caring role 
Future research will 
look at how social 
policies affect caring   
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Appendix 
 Table A1  Translating care need into public subsidies – the Aged Care Funding Instrument 
Domain Care level measure Scoring the care level From score to funding level Funding per day per level, 2013-14 
ADL Subsidy 
1.   Nutrition (readiness to 
eat) 
Independent, 
supervised, or assisted 
A (nil) B C D(high) 
High ≥88 $94.79 0 6.69 13.39 20.09 
2.   Mobility 
(transfers/locomotion) 
Independent, 
supervised, or assisted 0 6.88 13.76 20.65 
Med ≥62 $68.42 
3.   Hygiene (dressing, 
washing, grooming) 
Independent, 
supervised, or assisted 
0 6.88 13.76 20.65 
4.   Toileting (toilet 
use/completion) 
Independent, 
supervised, or assisted 0 6.11 12.21 18.31 
Low ≥18 $31.43 
5.   Continence Frequency 0 5.79 11.53 17.31 
Behaviour supplement 
6.   Cognitive skills Severity 
A (nil) B C D(high) 
High ≥50 $31.03 0 6.98 13.91 20.88 
7.   Wandering Frequency 0 5.91 11.82 17.72 
Med ≥30 $14.88 8.   Verbal Frequency 0 7.04 14.1 21.14 
9.   Physical Frequency 0 7.7 15.4 23.11 
Low ≥13 $7.18 
10. Depression Severity 0 5.71 11.43 17.15 
Complex health supplement 
11. Medication (assistance 
required) 
Complexity, frequency, 
assistance time 
11
12 A B C D High =3 $58.15 
A 0 0 2 2 
Med =2 $40.27 
12. Complexity (procedures) Complexity, frequency 
B 0 1 2 3 
C 0 1 2 3 
Low =1 $14.14 
D 0 2 3 3 
Note: Domains are assigned a severity from A (nil) to D (high). Some are weighed and summed. Some are applied to a matrix to produce a score for each of three 
subsidies/supplements. Some have higher weight than others (e.g., among ADL domains, mobility and hygiene affect ADL score more than continence). Score thresholds 
in turn determine care level for funding. Source: Authors’ interpretation of health.gov.au 
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 Table A2    Fees that residential care providers could charge care recipients pre-2013-14 changes 
Fee Residential Low Care or Extra Service place Residential High Care Residential Respite Community care packages 
Basic 
daily 
fee for 
daily 
expens
es 
Max 85% of AP ($44.50 per 
day); flat fee 
 
Max 85% of AP ($44.50 per 
day); flat fee 
 
Max 85% of AP ($44.50 per 
day); flat fee 
 
Max 17.5% of AP ($12.38 per 
day); flat fee 
 
Former 
income 
tested fee 
for care 
and 
accomm-
odation 
expenses 
Max 135% of AP ($70.70 per 
day); based on 42% taper on 
income beyond 125% of AP 
 
Max 135% of AP ($70.70 per 
day); based on 42% taper on 
income beyond 125% of AP 
 
n/a n/a 
Former 
accomm-
odation 
charge 
n/a 
Max 64% of AP ($32.58 per 
day); based on taper of 0.048% 
on assets beyond $40.5k 
 
n/a n/a 
Former 
accomm-
odation 
Bond 
Lump sum or periodic payment; 
based on any proportion of 
assets beyond 250% of annual 
AP ($43k). 11% and 21% of AP 
can be deducted from bonds of 
$20.52k-$39.72k and $39.72k+ 
for five years. Home included 
up to $144.5k unless occupied 
by relative/carer 
 
 
n/a n/a n/a 
Extra 
Service 
Charge 
(for higher 
standard)  
Max pre-agreed by Government. 
Pays if in extra service place. Fee 
reduces Government care subsidy 
by 25% of fee. 
n/a 
Max pre-agreed by Government. 
Pays if in extra service place. Fee 
reduces Government care subsidy 
by 25% of fee. 
n/a 
Additional 
amenity 
fee 
Pre-agreed between provider 
and resident. Per amenity (e.g., 
newspaper / hairdressing) 
n/a 
Pre-agreed between provider 
and resident. Per amenity (e.g., 
newspaper / hairdressing) 
n/a 
Note: AP denotes Age Pension; Figures are for single standard aged care recipient, as at Mar-Sep 2013, in 2013 prices, as proportion of Age Pension of $52.4 per 
day or dollar amount per day; Indexation rules mean some fees may not move with AP for percentage rates shown to stay constant (the figures should therefore 
be treated as indicative); Applies to government subsidised aged care; Caps on income and means tested fees under reform are annual but shown here as daily   
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 Table A3    Fees that residential care providers could charge care recipients post-2013-14 changes 
Fee Residential care (no high-low distinction) Residential Respite Home care packages 
Basic 
daily fee 
for daily 
expenses 
Max 85% of AP ($44.50 per day); flat fee 
 
Max 85% of AP ($44.50 per 
day); flat fee 
 
Max 17.5% of AP ($12.38 per 
day); flat fee 
 
New 
income 
tested 
care fee 
(for home 
care) and 
new 
means 
tested 
care fee 
(for 
resident), 
which 
reduces 
care 
subsidy  
Annual max 130% of AP ($68.50 per day; lifetime max of 314% 
of AP); based on combined income and asset tested amount; 
That is, 50% taper on income beyond 119% of AP, plus 17%, 1%, 
and 2% taper on assets $40.5k-$144.5k, $144.5k-$353.5k, 
$353.5k+ (converted to per day basis), minus approx 100% AP 
(i.e. max accommodation supplement, which is clawed back 
first). Up to $144.5k of former home is included in test unless 
occupied by relative or carer. 
 
 
n/a 
Max 52% of AP ($27.47); based 
on 50%, 0%, and 50% tapers on 
income 119%-171%, 171%-
226%, and 226%-278% of AP 
(has effect of treating full, part, 
and non Age Pensioners 
differently) 
 
 
New Daily 
Accomm-
odation 
Payment 
(DAP), 
 
…or… 
 
Refund-
able 
Accomm-
odation 
Deposit 
(RAD) 
 
(which 
reduce 
supp-
lement) 
Fee based on means test (see above) and choice of providers 
with accommodation price levels: (1) up to approximately 100% 
of AP as standard, (2) up to 166% of AP if provider self-assesses 
as higher quality, (3) higher if provider agrees the price with 
Pricing Commissioner.  Means test claws back up to government 
max accommodation supplement, approximately 100% of AP 
and equivalent to level 1 price. 
 
  
 
RAD based on DAP amounts converted to lump-sum via Maximum 
Interest Rate. Cannot leave recipient with assets of less than $40.5k. 
Refundable with no deduction amounts permitted 
n/a n/a 
Extra 
Service 
Charge 
Max pre-agreed by Government. Pays if in extra service place. Fee 
reduces Government care subsidy by 25% of fee. 
 Max pre-agreed by Government. 
Pays if in extra service place. Fee 
reduces Government care 
subsidy by 25% of fee. 
n/a 
Additional 
amenity 
fee 
Pre-agreed between provider and resident. Per amenity (e.g., 
newspaper / hairdressing) 
Pre-agreed between provider 
and resident. Per amenity (e.g., 
newspaper / hairdressing) 
n/a 
(cont…) fees rate; Lifetime cap of $60k applies to income and means tested care fees only; Post-reform asset test includes $144.5k of own home unless occupied 
by relative or carer. Source: health.gov.au (now dss.gov.au) 
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 A1A  Older people in Australia provide less informal  
         care than is the case in other countries 
 A1B  Informal carers are predominantly women, in   
          Australia and elsewhere  
  
A1C  The majority of carers provide few hours of care 
 A1D  Some age groups care for children, spouse, & 
parents 
  
 A1E  But informal care results in lower employment rates   
          (higher poverty and lower incomes, not shown)… 
 A1F  …and higher rates of mental health problems   
         (though levels appear lower in Australia) 
  
Note: Australian HILDA data in all figures except for panel D, which is based on SDAC data. Source: OECD (2011, 2013b), Adapted from SDAC data in PC (2011) 
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